Palestinian
democracy at crossroads
The
Palestinian elections show that the democratic process is
constantly changing, writes Ramzy Baroud*
Palestinian
political life seems to be unwittingly embracing a distinctive
style, contradictory with its own traditional political
parametres. The last few weeks have been a clear attestation
to this political divergence.
Predictably, any serious transformation is not possible without a shakeup in Fatah, the largest political party within the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.
Late Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat established Fatah in 1959 to become the cornerstone of Palestinian resistance. Palestinian politics were then absorbed by two areas: regional, where the PLO strove to emerge as the sole representative of the Palestinian cause and internal, where various Palestinian factions competed to define their role within the PLO and the resistance movement as a whole.
Thanks
to Arafat, Fatah often emerged on top, but not unscathed.
The group had some serious fallouts with Arab states. Contentions
also arose amongst PLO factions, most often against the
backdrop of corruption charges, lack of transparency and
as a result of Arafat's style of managing the struggle:
decisive and domineering.
Every
phase of the Palestinian struggle, whether resulting from
its own dialectics or responding to regional and international
crises and transformations, influenced Palestinian political
mechanisms in some way. Nonetheless, a status quo was forming:
where Fatah overshadowed the PLO, and regardless of the
intensity or seriousness of the surrounding circumstances,
nothing could've changed that formula. Although the PLO
departure from Lebanon -- subsequent to the Israeli invasion
of 1982 -- hardly altered Fatah's superior positioning on
top of the Palestinian political pyramid, it certainly altered
its priorities. With its leaders headquartered in Tunisia,
resistance in its direct, not interpretive meaning was to
become localised, not exported. In 1987, Palestinians in
the occupied territories began their first Intifada, only
to be interrupted by the unwarranted and initially secretive
signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.
While
various Palestinian factions took on the responsibilities
of the 1987 Intifada, Fatah's young members carried a larger
share. They successfully renewed faith in the long exiled
party, and resurrected its relevance to the struggle altogether.
The Tunisia crowd was incapable of offering any practical
contributions to the struggle.
It
was during these years that the seeds of divergence within
Fatah were implanted. It seemed that the party was run by
two different leaderships, priorities and in fact objectives.
An occupied territories- based 'young guard' was being nurtured,
most of its members serving years in Israeli jails, while,
concurrently, the 'old guard' were increasingly perceived
with suspicion and mistrust.
Fatah's
unilateral signing of Oslo was a cause for serious friction.
But Arafat once again cleverly managed to avert a crisis,
though he sidelined most of the PLO's factions -- now based
in Damascus -- and eventually the PLO entirely.
Arafat,
along with a large contingent of the 'old guard' returned
from exile in 1994, creating a new political setting, one
that was clearly beyond their ability to administer.
Fatah
quickly filled the role of a quasi-government: the Palestinian
Authority. But the PA was not the PLO. The latter was created
under different political circumstances that promised to
deliver freedom and victory. The former was at best a dysfunctional
self- serving government structure, sanctioned by Israel
and funded by various Western countries. The lead management
of this structure constituted mostly of 'Tunisians', who
in turn represented influential families, the elitists with
substantial business clout. The rift was widening.
The
fracture within Fatah was overdue. Despite bashful attempts
to articulate itself at times, a semi- unity was maintained;
one reason was Arafat's still important presence as the
conduit that kept the Fatah ship from being completely submerged
into chaos and factionalism; another was the Hamas challenge
and its rise as a potent political, social and resistance
force; a third was the outbreak of the Second Palestinian
Uprising of 2000, which helped espouse relative unity within
Fatah and among most Palestinian groups collectively resisting
the Israeli occupation.
Arafat's
mysterious death in November 2004 signaled a return to the
Fatah turmoil. Mahmoud Abbas survived the first fallout
with the young guard when he convinced charismatic Fatah
leader Marwan Barghouti -- currently serving five terms
in Israeli jails -- to call off plans to compete in PA presidential
elections. After a double scare, Barghouti conceded, leaving
the stage for Abbas, now the sole Fatah candidate, to sweep
the votes of the Palestinian public.
But
the gap grew even wider after Israel unilaterally 'disengaged'
from Gaza with the hope of consolidating its control over
East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Violence in Gaza and charges
of corruption everywhere else motioned that a breakdown
in the PLO's largest faction was now imminent. Concurrently,
Hamas continued to imprint itself on public opinion as a
model of discipline, unity and national responsibility.
The group trounced Fatah in recent municipal elections,
claiming three of four West Bank cities.
The
political plot thickens with the encroaching date of the
parliamentary elections on 25 January. Marwan Barghouti
finally made the rift in Fatah an official one when his
supporters submitted a separate alternative list of candidates
to contest the elections under a different party name: Al-Mustaqbal
(The Future). The move has opened the door for various dramatic
possibilities and has ignited fear that a split in Fatah
means a possible Hamas victory. The latter possibility prompted
the US House of Representatives to pass a resolution threatening
a denial of financial aid to the PA if Hamas is allowed
participation. The EU has also declared that a Hamas victory
will make it difficult for the organisation to maintain
its financial support of Palestinians.
Palestinian
democracy faces its greatest challenge yet. The Fatah turbulence
was expected to express itself in so dramatic a matter as
a decisive divorce between the old and young guard. However,
it is imperative that such turmoil remains confined to the
ballot box. Whatever the outcome, Palestinians must not
yield to external pressure or internal strife, thus compromising
their democratic experience.
*
The writer is a Palestinian-American author.